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I. INTRODUCTION
Although South Africa and the United States are different
in many significant ways, what is striking to an American
visiting South Africa1 are the similarities. Others have re-
marked on these common characteristics, in general political
and social terms,' in the justice system,3 and in the context of
the practice of capital punishment." Prompted by observations
contained in an essay in honor of a leader of the movement to
abolish capital punishment in South Africa,5 this article ex-
1. The author spent a sabbatical visiting the University of Cape Town, South
Africa in the spring, 1992.
2. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, THE MIRROR AT MIDNIGHT (1990).
3. A. Leon Higginbotham, Racism in American and South African Courts:
Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479 (1990).
4. David Bruck, On Death Row in Pretoria Central, THE NEW REPUBLI,. July
13, 1987, at 18.
5. Etienne Mureinik, Caring About Capital Punishment, in ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF ELLISON KAHN 216 (Coenraad Visser ed., 1989). See infra note 142
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plores the question of whether the history of racial discrimina-
tion in these countries has played a role in their practice of
imposing the death penalty, and in their continued willingness
to execute citizens despite the trend towards abolition of this
penalty in the civilized world.
The United States stands alone among Western democrat-
ic states in retaining, and carrying out, the death penalty for
ordinary crimes during peacetime. South Africa presents a
somewhat more complicated picture. The country could hardly
be described as an egalitarian democratic state, given that it
has denied the vote to a majority of its citizens and strictly
enforced the law of apartheid that made discrimination based
on race mandatory in virtually all aspects of life. Nonetheless,
it prides itself on its Western style judicial system, praised as
next only to the British system in its fairness and the high
quality of its bench and bar.6 In terms of capital punishment,
however, South Africa, unlike Great Britain, has continued to
employ this extreme penalty as punishment for murder and
other serious felonies.'
Both the United States and South Africa might have been
expected to follow the trend in the countries of Western Eu-
rope, Canada, and South America towards abolition of the
death penalty for ordinary crimes during peacetime. The Unit-
ed States has much more in common with abolitionist coun-
and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., ALBIE SACHS, JuSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 32-34 (1973); see also
C.R.M. Dlamini, The Influence of Race on the Administration of Justice in South
Africa, 4 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 37, 40 (1988) (noting that the judiciary is regarded
as impartial).
7. While the death penalty remains an authorized punishment in South Afri-
ca today, and judges impose it with some frequency, no one has actually been
hanged (except for one person in the independent homeland of Bophuthatswana)
since the moratorium declared in connection with the current negotiations aimed
at a new constitution. The African National Congress has called for the abolition
of capital punishment. The Afican National Congress, The Structure of a Constitu.
tion for a Democratic South Africa, in A CONSTITUTION FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH
AFRICA 24, 32 (advising the South African Bill of Rights should contain "protection
of life including the abolition of the death sentence.") reprinted in XVII CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 5 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1992).
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tries than with most of the remaining retentionist countries,
such as Iran, Iraq, or China. Similarly, despite the shameful
history of its apartheid regime, South Africa, too, shares more
common values in terms of its judicial system and cultural
norms with Western democracies than it does with the totali-
tarian regimes that represent the bulk of retentionist states. In
this connection, it is significant that South Africa generally
imposes death as a punishment through the formal judicial
system, and observing basic due process guarantees, rather
than extralegally as is the case in most other African states. 8
My hypothesis is that the attitude towards capital punish-
ment, as well as perhaps towards other methods of corporal
punishment, in the United States and South Africa may have
been formed, and may continue to be influenced by, the history
of racial relationships in the two countries.9 In both countries,
white Europeans subjugated blacks, first through slavery and
then through repressive legislation and practices. Blacks were
seen as inferior to the dominant white race, and the law tried
to prevent intermingling of the races through regulation of
interracial sex and marriage. ° Blacks were also
disproportionately likely to be the victims of the capital and
corporal punishment system." I am suggesting that physical
punishments, and particularly the death penalty, were used
more extensively, and continue to be tolerated, in part because
blacks were not seen fully as human beings, beings who feel
pain the same way others do. The dehumanizing aspect of
these penalties was therefore obscured by their application
8. AMNESTY INT'L, WHEN THE STATE KIS 205 (1989) [hereinafter WHEN THE
STATE KILLS].
9. By positing this theory, and suggesting ways in which the history of the
two countries contains parallel developments that seem to support it, I am not
claiming to establish that there is a direct connection between race and capital
punishment. If proof could ever be adduced to show such a connection, it would
require inquiry in the fields of social science, psychology, and history that is far
beyond the capacity of the present author or the scope of this article.
10. See infra parts EI.A.2, m.B.2.
11. See infra parts M.A.3., IILB.3.
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disproportionately to blacks, and more particularly to black
men, who were perceived to be threatening to white women.
Accordingly, even though capital punishment appears no
longer to be applied in an overtly discriminatory way, its asso-
ciation with the subjugation of blacks may well have prevented
both South Africa and the United States from fully recognizing
the pain and torture that have caused most of the Western
civilized world to abandon the practice. Countries with much
in common with the United States and South Africa have de-
cided that capital punishment can no longer be justified, per-
haps partly because, to paraphrase Nietzsche, the pain in-
volved hurts more than it did before. 2 In the modern civilized
world, the execution of citizens by the state is seen more and
more in the same light as torture. Like torture, capital punish-
ment denies the humanity of the offender and implies the total
subjugation of a fellow human being." When that fellow hu-
man being is not recognized as just like us, however, we may
not notice that the pain "hurts more."
My thoughts about the relationship between continued
imposition of death sentences and racism are informed not only
by the history of the application of the penalty in both the
United States and South Africa, but also by the images associ-
ated with a state's execution of one of its citizens. An execution
ordered and carried out by government authority implies total
subjugation of the person, just as did the slave laws of the
early American South and the system of apartheid in force
until recently in South Africa. An execution, no matter how it
is accomplished, involves killing a bound and defenseless hu-
man being. Such physical punishment, outside perhaps the
context of war, has been tolerated only when the object of the
treatment is seen as an inferior being, a being who does not
12. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BITH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF
MORALS 199-200 (1956) (stating that in early times "pain did not hurt as much as
it does today"), quoted in Jeffrey Reiman, JuStice, Civilization, and the Death Pen-
alty: Answering van den Haag, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 111, 135 (1985).
13. Reiman, supra note 12, at 140.
1993] 239
BROOK. J. IN1TL L.
have the same values, feelings, or rights as the dominant soci-
ety.
II. THE ANOMALY OF THE CONTINUED PRACTICE OF EXECU-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE WORLD
CONTEXT
A The United States Stands Alone Among Western Democra-
cies
A recent book on capital punishment in the United States
begins as follows: "The pattern is so simple it is stunning.
Every Western industrial nation has stopped executing crimi-
nals, except the United States.""' All of Western Europe has
abolished the death penalty during peacetime. In the Ameri-
cas, Mexico has long prohibited capital punishment for ordi-
nary crimes, 5 with the last execution having taken place in
1937. Canada abolished the death penalty for ordinary offenses
in 1976. In 1979 Nicaragua abolished the death penalty for all
crimes, while Brazil and Peru abolished the penalty for ordi-
nary offenses. In the early 1980s, El Salvador and Argentina
abolished capital punishment for ordinary crimes. Australia
abolished the penalty for ordinary offenses in 1984, and for all
offenses in 1985. The Philippines and New Zealand joined the
abolitionist ranks in the late 1980s. Among highly developed
countries across the globe, only Japan still retains capital pun-
ishment for ordinary crimes, and even there the debate over its
use is intense following recent hangings after a three-year
moratorium. 6
14. FRANKLIN E. ZIMwG & GORDON HAWINS, CAPITAL PUNIsHMENT AND THE
AMEICAN AGENDA 3 (1986).
15. Countries that are abolitionist only for "ordinary crimes" retain the possi-
bility of death sentences for exceptional crimes, such as those committed during
wartime or under military law. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 8, at 260.
16. See Yoshiaki Itoh, Reported Executions Revive Debate Over Capital Punish.
ment, NIKEI WEEKLY, Apr. 5, 1993; Kevin Rafferty, Japan Resumes Death Penal-
ty, REUTERS GUARDIAN, Mar. 29, 1993.
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The United States thus stands alone among civilized, in-
dustrialized Western democracies in retaining capital punish-
ment for ordinary crimes in times of peace. This position has
resulted in placing the United States in some rather anoma-
lous situations with respect to the international community, a
community which the United States normally prides itself in
leading, especially in the area of human rights. As early as
1966, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (International Covenant), which reserves the death
penalty for only the most serious crimes and prohibits its im-
position on those who were under eighteen years of age at the
time of the offense.' Yet for twenty-five years, as the Interna-
tional Covenant was being signed by more than one hundred
countries, the United States refused to adopt this covenant,
maintaining what to some was a highly hypocritical posi-
tion.'8
The United States has now finally ratified, 9 effective
September 1992, the International Covenant, but it has done
so only with significant reservations relating to the imposition
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 6,
999 U.N.T.S. 171. Subsequently, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly affirmed
the desirability of abolishing capital punishment. See GA. Res. 28/57, U.N. GAOR,
26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, [ 3, U.N. Doc. A18429 (1972); GA. Res. 32/61, U.N.
GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, 1, U.N. Doc. A/3245 (1978). In addition, in
1983, the Council of Europe added a protocol to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, providing, except in war-
time: "The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such
penalty or executed." Nov. 4, 1950, Protocol No. 6, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [here-
inafter European Convention].
18. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. Doc. No. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. *6 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 649 (1992) [hereinafter COMMITTEE
REPORT].
19. Discussions had taken place under the Carter Administration; President
Reagan let them lapse, but President Bush, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
put the discussions back on Congress's agenda. The Senate gave its advice and
consent to the ratification of the Covenant, with the important reservations dis-
cussed in the text, on April 2, 1992. Id. at *9; see infra notes 20-24 and accompa-
nying text.
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of capital punishment. ° First, the United States insists on
being able to execute persons who were under the age of eigh-
teen when they committed their crimes.21 Second, the United
States refuses to comply with the prohibition against crual,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment except to the
extent that such treatment or punishment is prohibited under
the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.' This second reservation was necessary
to deal with the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in the Soering case,2 1 which found that subjecting the
defendant, Jens Soering, to Virginia's death row would violate
his human rights, according to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms.'
The Soering case is one of several recent instances which
highlight the irony of the United States as defender of a penal-
ty which the rest of the Western world has abandoned, at least
in part because it is considered to constitute a violation of
basic human rights. In 1985 a couple was killed in Virginia.
Investigation soon focused on their twenty year old daughter, a
student at the University of Virginia, and her boyfriend, Jens
Soering, the son of a West German diplomat. The two had fled
to Great Britain, and when the United States sought their
extradition on murder charges, an international rights lawyer
urged Great Britain to refuse on the grounds that Soering
20. COMNTTEE REPORT, supra note 18.
21. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at *9. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989), and Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court affirmed death sentences imposed on defendants who were 17 and
16 years of age, respectively, when they committed the homicide. In Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), by a plurality vote, the Court failed to approve
the death sentence imposed on one who was 15 at the time of the crime, with
Justice O'Connor supplying a fifth vote only on the basis that the Oklahoma legis-
lature had not made clear its intention to allow execution of those under the age
of 18.
22. COM TTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at *10.
23. Case of Soering, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 28 LL.M.
1063 (1989).
24. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
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would be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment if
he were to face the prospect of death row in Virginia.'
The European Court of Human Rights agreed, primarily
relying on the undisputed facts that convicted capital defen-
dants in Virginia spent an average of six to eight years on
death row, with most of that time spent confined to a small
cell, and that, fifteen days before their scheduled execution
date, inmates are moved to an unlighted cell near the electric
chair, where they are watched constantly.26 The Court also
noted that human rights law prohibits imposition of the death
penalty on one who was under eighteen years old at the time
of the crime,27 and that therefore Soering, who was just eigh-
teen when he committed the crime, would be more susceptible
to the inhumane treatment of death row.
A second example where this country has been placed in
the position of defending capital punishment against the
charge that it violates basic human rights concerns several
natives of Mexico facing execution in the United States. Mexi-
co, though not generally known for the respect for human
rights accorded by its judicial and penal systems, has not car-
ried out an execution in more than fifty years. When two men
in Texas, Ramon Montoya and Ricardo Aldape Guerra, ap-
proached their execution dates recently, both the Mexican
government and protestors in Mexico called on Governor Ann
Richards to commute the sentences.28 On behalf of Montoya,
the Mexican National Human Rights Commission, as well as
the National Network of Civil Human Rights Organizations
made up of more than thirty Mexican groups, called for a re-
25. Case of Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1088.
26. Case of Soering, 28 IL.M. at 1086.
27. Case of Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1099.
28. Before Governor Richards was required to act on the applications, Ramon
Montoya was initially granted a stay of his January 16, 1993 execution date by
the Supreme Court pending disposition of his certiorari petition, see Montoya v.
Texas, 744 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S.
Jan. 26, 1993) (No. 92-7351), and Guerra was granted a stay by the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals. Guerra v. Texas, 771 S.W.2d 453 (1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 925 (1989).
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prieve, not challenging Montoya's guilt (he had killed a Dallas
police officer), but only objecting to the death sentence.29 Mex-
icans were reported as "view[ing] the United States' increas-
ingly liberal use of the death penalty as racist and repug-
nant.""0 A spokesman for the Mexican attorney general's office
was quoted as describing the death penalty as "barbarous."31
Over the protestations of the Mexican government, Montoya
was executed on March 25, 1993.82
Not only do these examples show the uncomfortable and
ironic position in which the continued practice of capital pun-
ishment places the United States in the world context, they
have also resulted in abandonment of this country's long tradi-
tion of looking to international norms to help define what is
"cruel and unusual." When the Supreme Court evaluated, and
struck down, the penalty of denationalization in 1958, it noted,
citing to a United Nations survey, that "civilized nations of the
world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be
imposed as a punishment for crime."" Similarly, when the
Court found that the death penalty was a cruel and unusual
punishment when applied to the crime of rape of an adult
woman, it found that it was "not irrelevant" that only three of
29. Supreme Court Grants Stay for Texas Cop Killer, UPI, Jan. 27, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. In addition to objecting to the death
penalty, groups worldwide protested against the pending execution of Ricardo
Aldape Guerra, asserting that he was innocent of killing a police officer. A director
of Comite Nacional de La Raza explained: "This is the global aspect-not only are
we trying to save the life of an innocent man and how he was used as a scape-
goat--but ies also a protest of the justice system that is discriminatorily'used
against people of color." Jo Ann Zuniga, The Wrong Man?, THE HOUS. CHRON.,
Jan. 10, 1993, at Al.
Amnesty International has also petitioned for the return of an Illinois death
row inmate to Mexico. This man had fled to Mexico after being accused of killing
a police officer but was brought back to Illinois without the permission of the
Mexican government. Heather Heerssen, Holy Name Students Backing Rights
Group, THE PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 4, 1993, at 1C.
30. Christine Tierney, Mexicans View U.S. Death Penalty As Barbaric,
REUTERS, Sept. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
31. Id.
32. Texas Executes a Mexican Killer, Raising a Furor Across the Border, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1993, at A15.
33. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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sixty major nations in the world retained the death penalty for
that crime." The Court also noted the trend worldwide
against application of the felony-murder doctrine to execute
the nontriggerman when it held that capital punishment would
be disproportionately severe for one who did not kill, attempt
to kill, or intend to kill.'
Recently, however, when confronted with worldwide statis-
tics showing the trend away from capital punishment for ordi-
nary crimes during peacetime, and particularly as applied to
defendants under the age of eighteen at the time of the of-
fense,86 the Court has scoffed at the notion that the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution should be inter-
preted by reference to international norms. This development,
too, shows the growing isolation of the United States in terms
of its insistence on retaining the death penalty, even when this
ultimate punishment is imposed on very young offenders.
B. South Africa's Retention of the Death Penalty
In its capital punishment practices, South Africa is out of
step both with the western democracies it seeks to emulate
and with a significant movement toward abolition in Africa. In
developments comparable to those taking place in the United
States in the nineteenth century, South Africa restricted the
number of capital crimes. Moreover, even when the death pen-
alty was mandatory for several crimes, a large number of
death sentences were commuted by the executive branch.
34. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977). According to a 1965
United Nations survey, aside from the United States, only China (Taiwan), Mala-
wi, and the Republic of South Africa still used capital punishment for rape. U.N.
DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT, 1968, at 40, U.N.
Doc. ST)SOA/SD/9-10, U.N. Sales No. 62.1V.2 (1968), cited in Brief for Petitioner at
50, Coker, 433 U.S. 584.
35. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982). The Court limited
this principle to some extent in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987),
when it announced that a death sentence could be imposed on a major participant
in the underlying felony who displayed reckless indifference towards human life.
36. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989), the Court pointedly
noted that only "American conceptions of decency ... are dispositive rejecting the
dissenters' reliance on the overwhelming world trend against executing juveniles.
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During the 1960s, scholars and some members of the judi-
ciary in South Africa noted that South Africa was responsible
for a staggering proportion of the offenders being executed
throughout the world. The Society for the Abolition of the
Death Penalty in South Africa was established, and for a num-
ber of years, in a pattern comparable to that taking place in
the United States during the 1960s and early 1970s, execu-
tions dropped as challenges were raised to the use of capital
punishment in the modern era.
Similar challenges resulted in abolition of the penalty in
several newly emerging self-governing nations in Africa. Al-
though capital punishment continues to be used on the African
continent, a trend towards abolition can also be observed. Cape
Verde abolished the death penalty upon independence in 1975;
in 1990 Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mozambique
became abolitionist states. Eight other African countries. are
either abolitionist for all but exceptional crimes or do not, in
practice, execute: Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Niger,
Senegal, Seychelles, and Togo.
In both South Africa and the United States, the worldwide
trend toward abolition of capital punishment might have been
expected to prevail. While South Africa's apartheid policies
have made it a pariah state in recent history, its government
has generally followed British and Dutch traditions, and its
judicial system, in fact, places greater emphasis on due process
than most of its African neighbors. The United States has
found itself in the position of defending its adherence to capital
punishment against the overwhelming opinion of its strongest
allies. Perhaps the willingness of these two countries to contin-
ue to execute fellow citizens may have its roots in their histo-
ries, histories that contain some telling parallels in terms of
relationships between people of different races.
37. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 8, at 216.
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I1. SIMILAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW wrrH REGARD To RA-
CIAL DISCRIMINATION
A dramatic historical fact is common to both the United
States and South Africa. Although countless numbers of black
men have been executed to punish them for the alleged rape of
white women, not a single white man has been executed, ever,
in either country, for raping a black woman. This striking phe-
nomenon, which surely cannot be dismissed as pure coinci-
dence, is just the most visible symbol of an entire system of
laws that, sometimes on their face and sometimes only as
applied, have differentiated between the races.
Three aspects of these countries' histories seem relevant to
an understanding of this remarkable statistic. First, both coun-
tries were heavily involved in the slave trade, and both contin-
ued discriminatory practices long after outlawing slavery itself.
Although the comprehensive system of apartheid in South
Africa is in many ways not comparable with the situation in
the United States after the Civil War, racism has undoubtedly
affected, and continues to plague, significant aspects of life in
both countries.
Second, laws in each country were specifically concerned
with the regulation of interracial sex and marriage. These laws
incorporated the assumptions made in society about interracial
sexual relationships. White men were assumed to be "entitled"
to impose themselves on black women, whether they be slaves,
servants, or free women, while black men were seen as an
enormous threat to white women, requiring the utmost penal-
ties for any suggestion of attention, attention that was conclu-
sively presumed to be unwanted, if not hated and feared. This
double standard8 formed the basis of laws that explicitly dif-
ferentiated between conduct according to the race of the actors
involved. Such laws also reflect attitudes on the part of white
38. Rennie Simson, The Afro-American Female: The Historical Context of the
Construction of Sexual Identity, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY
229, 234 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
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society that, even today, refuse to accept free association, espe-
cially sexual association, between men and women of different
races.
39
Finally, both societies punished conduct more severely if it
was committed by a black offender, particularly when the vic-
tim of the crime was white. At times, the law made such dis-
tinctions explicit, but even when the law itself was colorblind,
in fact, black offenders were treated more harshly, again espe-
cially when the victim was white.
In combination, these aspects of legal developments in the
United States and South Africa help to explain how two societ-
ies, different in many ways, come to share the characteristic of
treating black rapists of white women with such unyielding
strictness while extending gkeat leniency to white men who
rape black women. They also reflect, I submit, the dominant
white society's general belief in its own superiority, and there-
fore the inferiority of blacks, that lies at the heart of its will-
ingness to subject fellow human beings to penalties that have
been abandoned as barbarous in most of the civilized world.
A. Differential Treatment by Race in the United States
1. Slavery and Racial Discrimination
The history of slavery in this country is too well known to
require extensive repetition here. Specific aspects of the slave
laws and Black Codes are, however, particularly relevant to
the present discussion. It must be remembered that slaves in
the antebellum South were treated as property, subject to the
total control of their masters, and not as human beings. One
commentator has noted that "[silavery in the American co1-
39. Studies from the 1970s show that a majority of whites surveyed objected
to interracial marriage, and 83% of whites would be "concerned" if their teenage
child was dating a black person. GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 50
(1989). Although there has been a steady increase of black-white marriages in the
United States, as of 1990, interracial marriages (between blacks and all other
races) still amounted to only 6% of all married couples. Climbing Jacob's Ladder,
THE Hous. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1993, at 1.
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nies took a particularly dehumanizing form."40 Slaves here
were under the absolute and total control of their masters,
unlike, for example, slaves in Latin America, whose family and
religious affairs stayed within the sphere of the church.4'
Even laws that appeared to recognize the humanity of the
slave, such as laws making certain willful assaults on slaves
criminal offenses, had as their ultimate motivation the protec-
tion of the master's property interest.42 In addition, bounty
laws in effect in various states offering rewards for bringing in
the scalp and ears of runaway slaves hardly suggest that
slaves were regarded as anything resembling human be-
ings .
43
In states outside the South, after slavery was abolished,
discrimination against the newly freed blacks was common. In
New York, for instance, five years after passage of the state's
emancipation statute, the legislature increased the property
requirement for blacks to vote, while at the same time remov-
ing any property qualification for voting by whites.44 And
while Pennsylvania, under the influence of the Quakers, was
significantly more tolerant towards its black population than
most of the colonies, even there blacks could be stopped on the
street and, if they lacked a ticket from their master, impris-
oned overnight without food or water and subjected to a public
whipping on their bare backs the next morning.45 The white
40. WILLIAM BOWERS, LEGAL HOMCIDE 141 (1984) [hereinafter BOWERS, LEGAL
HOhCIME].
41. Id.
42. The history of Virginia's statutes and cases regarding crimes by and
against slaves is chronicled in fascinating and thorough detail in A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only as an Enemy": The Legitimi-
zation of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal
Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REv. 969 (1992) [hereinafter Racial Powerlessness].
Two examples in which the law ostensibly protected slaves as persons but was
actually designed to maintain owners' property rights include a statute making it
a crime to maliciously stab a slave, id. at 1047, and a case allowing indictment of
a white person for knowingly injuring a female slave. Id. at 1053.
43. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATIER OF COLOR 12-13 (1978)
[hereinafter IN THE MATTER OF COLOR].
44. Id. at 148.
45. Id. at 276.
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colonists simply "could not, or at least did not, accept blacks in
anything but an inferior status."46
Moreover, while slavery and differential treatment based
on race were officially ended with the post-Civil War amend-
ments, racial discrimination has been much more difficult to
eradicate. It is worth remembering that the military remained
segregated until after World War II; Jackie Robinson was
allowed to play in the major leagues only in 1947; Brown v.
Board of Education47 was not decided until 1954; in 1955
Marion Anderson was the first black singer to perform at the
Metropolitan Opera in New York; until 1967 statutes in more
than sixteen states still prohibited interracial marriages;48
and, even now, litigation is pending which challenges de facto
school segregation in Hartford, Connecticut.49
2. Interracial Sexual Relationships and Marriage
From their arrival in America, European migrants
"merged racial and sexual ideology in order to differentiate
themselves from Indians and blacks, [and] to strengthen the
mechanisms of social control over slaves ... .5  Sexuality
served to confirm white dominance: civilized and rational
whites were naturally superior to savage and sensual blacks.
The antebellum South was deeply concerned with main-
taining racial purity, and therefore strictly prohibited sex -and
marriage across racial lines. For example, in Virginia interra-
cial marriage was prohibited by a 1691 statute which provided
that white men or women who married a black or Indian
would be banished from the colony forever.5' When the threat
46. Id. at 309.
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court declared- such
statutes unconstitutional.
49. See, e.g., George Judson, Lawsuit Attacks the Segregation of Urban Schools
from White Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1992, at 48.
50. ESTELLE FREEDMAN & JOHN D'EMuO, INTIMATE MATTRS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 86 (1988).
51. Act XVI, 3 LAWS OF VA. 86, 86-87 (Hening 1823) (enacted 1691), cited in
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial
250 [Vol. XIX:2
RACE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
of banishment failed to act as a sufficient deterrent, the penal-
ty was changed to six months imprisonment and a ten pound
fine, along with a fine of ten thousand pounds of tobacco for
the minister who performed the ceremony.52 All these pen-
alties for interracial marriage applied, until 1932, only to the
white partner; at that time, the penalty was increased to one
to five years' imprisonment and applied to both the white and
black spouse.5" Moreover, these laws prohibited only legitimiz-
ing interracial sexual relationships-they did not prevent
white masters from having sexual relationships with their
black slaves or servants.
Black women in the days of slavery were treated as objects
of sexual gratification, and were presumed to consent to such
treatment. Black women were seen as sensuous,' if not pro-
miscuous, so that a sexual encounter was "never against her
will."55 The white man's sexual relationships with black wom-
en were regarded as a natural and normal outlet in a country
in which men greatly outnumbered women. In addition to
instances of forcible intercourse with slaves and servants,
white men were also known to take black mistresses, either
Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1967-68
n.5 (1989).
52. Ch. XL]X, 3 LAWS OF VA. 447, 454 (Hening 1823) (enacted 1705), cited in
Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 51, 1995-96.
53. IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 43, at 46 (referring to VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-59 (1960) Repl. Vol.).
54. RicHARD G. HOFSTADTER, AMERICA AT 1750: A SOCIAL PORTRAIT 108
(1971).
Naked and libidinous: for the white man's preoccupation with Negro
sexuality was there at the very beginning, an outcome not only of his
own guilt at sexual exploitation-his easy access to the black woman was
immediately blamed on her lasciviousness-but also of his envious sus-
picion that some extraordinary potency and ecstatic experience were asso-
ciated with primitive lust.
Id.
55. Jessie Daniel Ames wrote in 1936: "White men have said over and
over-and we have believed it because it was repeated so often-that not only, was
there no such thing as a chaste Negro woman-but that a Negro woman could not
be assaulted, that it was never against her will." Quoted in Jacquelyn Dowd Hall,
The Mind That Burns in Each Body, in POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note 38, at 328,
331 [hereinafter The Mind That Burns in Each Body].
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visiting them in their quarters or maintaining separate resi-
dences for them.66"
On the other hand, white society found it inconceivable
that a white woman might consent to a sexual relationship
with a black man. The perceived sexual purity of white women
presented a sharp contrast to the supposed lasciviousness of
black women; a white southern woman who gave up her chas-
tity was indeed a "fallen womam"57 A white woman who suc-
cumbed to a black man had not just fallen; she must have been
raped. The law in some states specifically allowed a jury to
infer intent to commit rape from evidence merely showing
assault, if the complainant was a white woman and the defen-
dant a black man."8 Moreover, race was explicitly permitted to
be taken into account to rebut a presumption that a defendant
was trying to obtain consent to sexual intercourse. 59
The response of white male society to sex between a black
man and a white woman, sex that was presumed to be the
result of force, was powerful. One frequent reaction refused to
wait for the judicial system: lynching served as a tool of psy-
chological intimidation aimed at black men as a group, and
outbreaks of mob violence "were increasingly accompanied by
torture and sexual mutilation."0 Even as lynchings declined,
they continued to take place in response to the "special crime
of sexual assault,"6 which appeared to warrant extreme mea-
sures for the protection of white women against black rapists.
In addition to serving as an outlet for sexual desire, black
slave women were also seen, and treated, as breeders of more
slaves. 2 The status of a child, free or slave, was by law deter-
56. FREEDMAN & D'EMILIO, supra note 50, at 102-03.
57. Simson, supra note 38, at 231.
58. See, e.g., McCullough v. State, 73 S.E. 546, 547 (1912), cited in Brief Ami-
ci Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 17, Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977).
59. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 34 S.E. 135, 136 (1899) cited in Brief Amici
Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977).
60. The Mind That Burns in Each Body, supra note 55, at 330.
61. The Mind That Burns in Each Body, supra note 55, at 334.
62. Simson, supra note 38, at 230.
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mined by the status of its mother.' Accordingly, children of a
white man and a black slave were considered children of the
mother, despite the well-established English practice of deter-
mining the status of children according to their father.'
The treatment of interracial sexual relationships and mar-
riage in American history conveys the consistent message that
black women are available for the sexual pleasure of white
men, and that any offspring of such unions will be regarded as
black. On the other hand, white women are strictly off limits to
black men, and society will punish severely any violation of
their sexual purity. The value of the life and personal integrity
of women is directly related to race, as is society's tolerance of
the conduct of men in their sexual relationships.
3. Harsher Punishments Based on Race of
Offender and Victim
The punishment of criminal behavior by slaves and ser-
vants was complicated by the economic impact of most penal-
ties on the master: imprisonment would deprive the owner of
the slave's or servant's services during the period of incarcera-
tion; execution would deprive the owner of a valuable property
permanently. Indeed, at least one jurisdiction in the United
States, Virginia, compensated the owner of a slave who was
condemned to death." Punishment by whipping did not in-
volve such problems, and accordingly was the favored penalty
in both the United States and South Africa.
a. Different Penalties Prescribed Based on Race
In the antebellum South, the law explictly authorized
slaves, and sometimes free blacks as well, to be subjected to
physical punishment that was off limits for whites, even for
63. Act XII, 2 LAWS OF VA. 170, 170 (Hening 1823) (enacted 1662), cited in
Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 51, at 1967, 1971 nn.16 & 17.
64. IN THE MAITER OF COLOR, supra note 43, at 44.
65. See, e.g., Racial Powerlessness, supra note 42, at 1007, 1060.
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white servants. Thus, for example, it was no criminal offense
to subject a slave woman to a "cruel and unreasonable bat-
tery," as the master must have uncontrolled authority over the
body of his slaves in order to preserve their value as proper-
ty.' The disciplining of slaves was left entirely to the master,
such that even a master who killed his slave during the course
of such discipline was entitled to be acquitted.' White ser-
vants, on the other hand, could not be subjected to "immoder-
ate correction," and were allowed to be whipped while naked
only with the authorization of a justice of the peace. 8 The
usual punishment for resistance by white servants was exten-
sion of their period of servitude, while slaves, already commit-
ted for life, were subject to whipping. The racial basis of the
law is demonstrated, however, by its provision calling for both
slaves and free blacks who resisted any whites to be whipped
on their bare backs.69
In Virginia, as well as in some other states," at various
times legislation that imposed prison sentences on white men
convicted of rape required castration of blacks convicted of the
rape or attempted rape of white women.71 When a 1769 Vir-
ginia law noted that dismembering is often disproportionate to
the offense and contrary to principles of humanity, so that
castration of slaves would no longer be allowed, it retained a
specific exception for the attempted rape of a white woman."2
Similarly, in pre-Civil War Georgia, white men convicted of
66. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829), described in IN THE MATTER OF COL-
OR, supra note 43, at 8-9.
67. Racial Powerlessness, supra note 42, at 1027-28.
68. Racial Powerlessness, supra note 42, at 1027.
69. Racial Powerlessness, supra note 42, at 1028.
70. For example, an 1855 Kansas statute provided that a black man convicted
of raping a white woman could be castrated, while a white man convicted of the
same offense was subject to a maximum of five years' imprisonment. W. Haywood
Burns, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 89 (David Kairys ed.,
1982), cited in LAFREE, supra note 39, at 114.
71. Racial Powerlessness, supra note 42, at 1058 (referring to Act of 1769, ch.
XIX), in 8 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 358, 358-61 (William W. Hening ed.,
1819-23) [hereinafter HENING'S STATUTES].
72. Racial Powerlessness, supra note 42, at 1058 (referring to Act of 1769, ch.
XIX § 1 in HENING'S STATUTES 358, 358).
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rape were punishable by a fine or imprisonment, while a black
man, whether slave or free, convicted of raping or attempting
to rape a white woman was punished with death.73
Penalties for other crimes were also often more severe for
blacks, and especially for slaves, than those prescribed for
white offenders. In Virginia, for example, sixty-eight offenses
were capital crimes when committed by slaves, while the same
conduct by whites was punishable by, at most, imprison-
ment.74 In addition, even free blacks could be sold into slavery
for offenses subject only to a prison term if committed by
whites.75
After the Civil War, the so-called Black Codes were enact-
ed in the South to preserve white supremacy. These codes
provided for different punishments for whites and blacks, as
well as calling for harsher punishments, in some instances,
when the victims of crime were white. Crimes with black vic-
tims were often not prosecuted at all, or penalized only very
lightly. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had as one of its primary purposes the invalidation of
such codes.76
b. Southern States Retain Death Penalty for Rape
By the early twentieth century, capital punishment as an
authorized penalty for the crime of rape was almost exclusively
limited to the states of the former Confederacy.77 While south-
73. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union at 54 n.62,
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). The Georgia Penal Code of 1816, Secs. 33-
34, provided for two to twenty years imprisonment for rape and one to five years
for attempted rape. Id. at app. 2a n.5a. Ga. Acts of 1816, No. 508, Sec. 1, provid-
ed that, when committed by a slave or "free person of colour," rape or attempted
rape of a free white female was a capital offense to be punished by death. Id. at
app. 2a n.6a; see also LAFREE, supra note 39, at 141.
74. Racial Powerlessness, supra note 42, at 977.
75. Racial Powerlessness, supra note 42, at 978, 1023.
76. SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 119 (1989).
77. Eighteen states retained the penalty as of 1926, including Alabama, Ar-
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ern statutes did not explicitly differentiate on the basis of race,
studies have demonstrated that black men convicted of raping
white women were "the primary targets of the death penalty"
for rape: eighty-five percent of all executions for rape involved
this combination.78 Moreover, of the 455 persons executed for
rape between 1930 and 1969, 443 (97.4 percent) were executed
in the South. These figures, and the concentration of execu-
tions for rape in the South, surely support the notion that the
retention of capital punishment for this crime was related to
the abhorrence among whites of sexual assaults committed by
black men upon white women. A racial motivation may also
have played a role in a rather unusual legislative decision in
Tennessee, which abolished the death penalty in 1915 for mur-
der and treason, but specifically retained it for rape.79
c. More Severe Penalties Actually Imposed
In the United States, as in South Africa, statutes provid-
ing that the death penalty was mandatory for numerous seri-
ous felonies gave way first to statutes reducing the number of
capital crimes, and ultimately towards explicit granting of
discretion to the capital sentencer. Most jurisdictions in the
United States had, early in the twentieth century, replaced the
former mandatory capital punishment statutes with laws per-
mitting juries, or judges, to grant mercy to defendants convict-
ed of capital crimes." Even though these modern capital pun-
ishment statutes do not differentiate on the basis of the race of
the offender or the victim, comprehensive studies have shown
kansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virgin-
ia. See Petitioners' Brief at 37-38, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) citing
Bye, Recent History and Present Status of Capital Punishment in the United
States, 17 J. CRim. L. 234, 241-42 (1926).
78. LEGAL HOMICIDE, supra note 40, at 75 (citing a 1972 study by Professor
Marvin Wolfgang).
79. HUGo A. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 413 (rev. ed. 1967).
80. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 299, 318 (1976).
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that the death penalty is more likely to be imposed and carried
out if the offender is black, particularly if the victim is
white.8
1
When Donald Gaskins was electrocuted in 1991, he was
the first white man to be executed for killing a black victim in
almost fifty years."2 Mr. Gaskins had previously been convict-
ed of nine other murders, all of whites, and had been implicat-
ed in several other killings. His death sentence resulted from
his killing of a black fellow inmate, an inmate who had himself
been convicted of murder. Gaskins had been hired by the son
of the couple the black inmate had killed. The son, who was
white, served six months in prison.'
One of the historical phenomena that led to the suspension
of capital punishment in the United States was the undisputed
fact that, for the crime of rape, of 455 men who had been exe-
cuted between 1930 and 1969, 405 were black.' Black men
convicted of rape were seven times more likely to be sentenced
to death than white men; black men convicted of raping white
women were eighteen times more likely to be sentenced to
death than men convicted of rape in any other racial combi-
nation.85 And, as has been noted, in the history of the United
States, no white man had ever been executed for raping a
black woman.
These figures were partly a reflection of the fact, discussed
above, that capital punishment, especially for rape, was largely
a product of the South.s "Between 1935 and 1969 more exe-
81. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The Supreme Court, by
a five to four vote, rejected a systemic challenge to Georgia's capital sentencing
system, despite a convincing showing of gross disparities based on the race of the
offender and of the victim, finding that no inference of racial discrimination in any
particular case could be drawn from such disparate results.
82. David Margolick, Rarity for U.S. Executions: White Dies for Killing Black,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991, at 1.
83. As David Bruck noted at the time, "Tat's apparently the sort of criminal
record a white man needs to be executed for the murder of a black." Id.
84. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 18 CAPrrAL .PUN-
ISHmENT (1979).
85. See GROSS & MAURO, supra note 76, at 122-23.
86. Marvin Wolfgang found a "systematic, differential practice of imposing the
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cutions took place in the South than in all the other regions
-combined."87 And even in non-southern states, such as New
York, executions tended to increase during periods when the
black population increased dramatically.'
This trend continues to the present. Post-Gregg9 execu-
tions have also been predominantly in the states that had high
execution rates pre-Furman,9° which were primarily the
southern states.9' Between 1977 and 1986, Florida, Texas,
Louisiana, and Georgia executed three times as many prison-
ers as all of the rest of the states combined. 2 Of the total
number of executions since the Supreme Court approved new
death penalty on blacks for rape and, most particularly, when the defendants are
black and their victims are white" in a study of seven southern states from 1945
to 1965. Marvin Wolfgang, Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape,
reported in WILLIAM BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA (1974).
87. ZnVIRING & HAWKINS, supra note 14, at 30.
88. The proportion of blacks doubled among those executed in New York in
the 1930s and 1940s, and blacks tended to be executed at a younger age, as well
as being executed without resorting to appeals to higher courts. BOWERS, LEGAL
HOMICIDE, supra note 40, at 97.
89. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), along with its companion cases
involving statutes from Florida, Texas, North Carolina and Louisiana, the Supreme
Court approved statutes that provided for separate guilt-innocence and penalty
phases, and guided the sentencer's discretion as to whether to impose a death
sentence, while striking down statutes making capital punishment mandatory for
specific categories of crime.
90. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court, in a brief
per curiam opinion, effectively invalidated all death penalty statutes as they were
then applied. Five justices concurred in 'this result, relying on different rationales.
Justices Brennan and Marshall found the death penalty per se violative of the
Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. Id. at
305, 370. Justice Douglas based his opinion largely on the discriminatory appli-
cation of capital punishment, id. at 256-57; Justice Stewart objected mainly to its
"freakish" imposition, id. at 309-10; while Justice White saw it being applied so
infrequently and arbitrarily as to cease to serve any proper penological function.
Id. at 313.
91. The main exceptions to the predominance of the South were New York
and California, which had high execution rates before Furman. BOWERS, LEGAL
HOMICIDE, supra note 40, at 30. California retains the death penalty and has
more than 300 inmates on death row, but only one has been executed since Gregg.
Evan Ca Minker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton
Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992). New York does not authorize capital punish-
ment. N.Y. PENAL § 70.00 (McKinney 1986).
92. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 14, at 140.
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state capital punishment statutes in 1976, close to ninety per-
cent took place in the South."
Moreover, differentiation of punishment based on the race
of the offender and the victim is not limited to executions, nor
to an earlier part of the nation's history. Disparities in the
penalties imposed for rape persist; when the combination of
black men and white women was isolated, a study conducted
in a midwestern city in the 1970s found that black sex offend-
ers were treated by far the most harshly. 4
Racial disparities have also been found in the history of
executions carried out by the military. A recent study of execu-
tions after courts-martial in Europe during World War II by
Professor J. Robert Lilly at Northern Kentucky University
demonstrated that, even though blacks accounted for less than
ten percent of the troops, eighty-seven percent of those execut-
ed for the crime of rape were black.95
Differential treatment of offenders according to their own
race as well as the race of their victims has thus been preva-
lent throughout American history. This differentiation is con-
sistent both with the lesser value placed on black life and
liberty, and with the stereotype of blacks, especially black men,
as posing a particular threat to white society.
93. The figures through the end of 1992 are as follows: Texas (59); Florida
(31); Louisiana (21); Virginia (19); Georgia (15); Alabama (10); Missouri (8); Nevada
(5); North Carolina (5); Arkansas (4); Mississippi (4); South Carolina (4); Utah (4);
Arizona (3); Oklahoma (3); Delaware (2); Indiana (2); California (1); Illinois (1);
Washington (1); Wyoming (1). Of the 203 executions, 180 took place in the South.
Telephone Interview with Kica Mates, Research Director of the Capital Punish-
ment Project of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (May 18, 1993).
94. Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual Stratification by Race on Official
Reactions to Race, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 842, 844, 852 (1980) (describing a study con-
ducted in a large midwestern city between 1970 and 1975, which found that black
men accused of sexually assaulting white women received significantly more seri-
ous sanctions than other sexual assault suspects).
95. Francis X Clines, When Black Soldiers Were Hanged: a War's Footnote,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, at 20 (25 blacks and 4 whites were executed for the
rape of civilians).
1993] 259
BROOK. J. INVTL L.
B. South Africa: From Colonial Rule to Apartheid
1. Racial Stratification
Almost as familiar as the history of slavery in the United
States is the apartheid regime established in South Africa by
the National Party in 1948. Under this strict system of segre-
gation of the races, the sort of citizenship and rights a person
enjoyed correlated precisely with that person's racial classifica-
tion.96 The apartheid rule codified and expanded the racial
stratification prevalent throughout the modem history of
southern Africa, after the appearance of white settlers in the
seventeenth century.
White domination was initiated almost immediately by the
Dutch East India Company, which divided society into -two
classes, the white colonists, who were landowners and employ-
ers, and the black laborers, both imported slaves and local
Khoikhoi workers, who performed the manual labor deemed to
be too degrading for whites.97 White control spread through-
out southern Africa, as the British and Afrikaner colonists
moved east and north from the original Cape Colony settle-
ment, and continued to be maintained through technological
advantages, despite the fact that whites comprised less than
twenty percent of the population." Colonialism here, as else-
where, assumed the superiority of European culture over the
"primitive backwardness" of the "childlike" native people.'
Slavery was prevalent in South Africa during the early
colonial period. In 1828 the House of Commons passed a mo-
tion that the colonial government was to be told to "secure to
all the natives of South Africa, the same freedom and protec-
tion as are enjoyed by other free people of that Colony whether
96. RACE AND THE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 209 (A.J. Rycroft et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter RACE AND THE LAW].
97. STUDY COMMISSION ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA, SOUTH
AFRICA: TIME RUNNING OUT 32-33 (1981) [hereinafter TIME RUNNING OUT].
98. Id. at 31-32.
99. Dlamini, supra note 6, at 37.
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English or Dutch."' 0 Even after the abolition of slavery, how-
ever, as in the United States, white superiority was main-
tained through political, economic, and social domination.
During the nineteenth century, somewhat comparably to
the situation in the pre-Civil War United States, the treatment
of blacks varied in different parts of the country. In the Cape
of Good Hope and Natal, which were dominated by British
influence, blacks enjoyed limited citizenship rights. In the
Orange Free State and Transvaal Republics, under the rule
primarily of Afrikaners, blacks, while subject to taxation and
service of white farmers, were denied any right to citizenship
or equal treatment under the law.'
When the Union of South Africa became a self-governing
British dominion in 1910, the parliament consisted of only
white members, and, except in the Cape Province,0 " the fran-
chise was limited to the white population. Most white South
Africans, whether British or Afrikaner, shared the prevalent
view that blacks were an innately inferior race that must be
governed by the white man.0 3 Long before the National Par-
ty explicitly adopted the comprehensive policy of apartheid in
1948, segregation of the races had been the norm in the Re-
public of South Africa throughout the twentieth century. Pass
laws and land laws prohibited blacks from traveling freely or
owning land, except in designated African preserves, and even
from living legally outside these preserves (which later became
the so-called "homelands") unless employed by whites.' 4 And,
of course, the apartheid system in effect until February 2,
1990, controlled all aspects of a person's life in direct relation
to the color of that person's skin.
100. LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 60 (1990). Actually, the
Cape Governor independently, two days after passage of this legislation, made
Khoikhoi equal before the law with whites. Id.
101. S.D. Girvin, Race and Race Classification, in RACE AND THE LAW, supra
note 96, at 3.
102. L.J. Boulle, Race and the Franchise, in RACE AND ,THE LAW, supra note
96, at 12.
103. TIME RUNNING OUT, supra note 97, at 38-39.
104. TIME RUNNING OUT, supra note 97, at 39.
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2. Regulation of Sex and Marriage
Comparably to developments in the United States, in parts
of South Africa, such as the Transvaal and Orange Free State,
whites and blacks were treated differently in terms of the laws
relating to sexual relationships. Before formation of the Union
of South Africa, statutes generally prohibited sexual inter-
course between white women and black men, though violators
were usually prosecuted only when such intercourse was
forced." 5 On the other hand, in a country with very few
white women, white men frequently had sexual relationships
with the black servants of the household.0 6
In the Transvaal, the principal marriage law10 7 made no
provision for marriages other than those of white persons.
Later, an 1896 statute provided: "The People will not permit
any equalisation of coloured persons with white inhabit-
ants." O8 Yet, the following year, a law was passed authoriz-
ing the marriage of coloured people who "by education and
civilisation have become distinguished from barbarians, and
who therefore desire to live in a Christian and civilised man-
ner, and accordingly wish to be lawfully united in mar-
riage."
10 9
Voluntary sexual intercourse was also generally prohibited
between black men and white women'. In the Transvaal, by a
1902 statute, it was an offense punishable by five years impris-
onment for a white woman voluntarily to have unlawful carnal
105. SACHS, supra note 6, at 174.
106. A popular book, recently aired as a television series in South Africa, fol-
lows the history of a prominent white vineyard owner who tried to gain accep-
tance in the white world for the son he fathered with his black mistress.
LUANSHYA GREER, REAP THE WHIRLWND (Rowan Books, 1992) (1991). The story
resembles in many ways Alex Haley's depiction of his own ancestors in the Ameri-
can miniseries Queen.
107. See E.L. Matthews, South African Legislation Relating to Marriage or
Sexual Intercourse Between Europeans and Natives or Coloured Persons, Vol.
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connection with any native; the native man was subject to six
years imprisonment, as well as twenty-four lashes. It was also
an offense punishable by ten years and twenty-four lashes for
any person to procure a white woman for such purposes."'
The public attitudes towards interracial marriage in the
Orange Free State were comparable to those in the Transvaal,
though that province had no formal prohibition against mixed
marriages as of 1899. In practice, very few marriages between
the races took place in the Orange Free State.
In the Cape and Natal provinces, on the other hand, much
like in the northern states of the United States, after abolition
of slavery mixed marriages were authorized; no legal bar exist-
ed to marriage between Europeans and members of other rac-
es."' Later, however, in 1903, the Natal parliament declared
any illicit sexual intercourse between a white woman and a
coloured person to be unlawful, with each party subject to two
years imprisonment. In addition, the male was also subject to
twenty-five lashes."
Early in the twentieth century, South Africa determined
that sexual contact between the races must be curtailed, *and
accordingly prohibited sexual intercourse between "Europeans"
and "natives," gradually increasing the penalties, and even
extending the prohibition to sexual activity short of inter-
course."' One report recommended that rape remain a capi-
tal crime in order to protect "poor white girls... going into
Chinese laundries and liquor bottling establishments, where
they are... exposed to the evils of close objectionable contact.
with orientals and natives.""4 The same report noted that
"violating chastity, especially where the offender is a male of
110. Id. at 317-18.
111. Id. at 313, 314-15.
112. Id. at 318.
113. See SACHS, supra note 6, at 174-77 (describing South African Immorality
Acts of years 1927, 1950, and 1957).
114. Section 127 of the 1913 Report of the deV'lliers Commission into Assaults
on Women, quoted in Ellison Kahn, How Did We Get Our Lopsided Law on the
Imposition of the Death Penalty for Common Law Crimes? And What Should We
Do About It?, 2 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 137, 140 n.27 (1989).
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inferior race, is keenly felt among white people as an irrepa-
rable wrong to the victim and her relatives and an outrage
upon the white race.""' Conduct that would be innocuous if
it occurred between members of the same race could become
criminal when the accused was black and the "victim"
white.11
6
Thus, as in America, the regulation of sexual intercourse
and marriage was closely tied to the race of the partners. The
dominent white society, although numerically in the minority,
asserted its superiority over the black population in part
through its control over sexual relationships.
3. Differential Punishments
a. Laws Providing Greater Punishment
In South Africa, from the earliest colonial era, punish-
ments were defined by the race of the offender. While impris-
onment was considered an appropriate penalty for white Euro-
peans, it was deemed far too lenient for native Africans, who
would instead be subject to whipping or other corporal
punishment."7 The colonists were convinced that only corpo-
ral punishment would have any effect on the blacks-and the
whipping had to be severe because blacks were thought to have
thicker skin, and therefore to feel the pain less, than white
men."' The Director of Prisons concluded in 1935 that at
least six strokes for whites and eight strokes for blacks were
necessary to constitute effective punishment."9
115. Id. § 38.
116. See, e.g., R. v. Olakwu, 1958 (2) S.A 357 (c) (involving an African domes-
tic servant convicted for writing love letter to an unmarried white woman), cited
in SACHS, supra note 6, at 152.
117. Steve Pet6, Punishment and Race: The Emergence of Racially Defined Pun-
ishment in Colonial Natal, 1 NATAL U.L. & SOCY REV. 99 (1986).
118. SACHS, supra note 6, at 196.
119. SACHS, supra note 6, at 197. The Penal Reform Commission noted, howev-
er, that after the eighth stroke the flesh would be numb. SACHS, supra note 6, at
197.
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Within the prisons, as well, brutal flogging was routinely
used against black prisoners, even for minor offenses, while
white prisoners would have to commit a serious infraction to
be subject to a flogging.' °
b. Harsher Penalties Imposed
As in the United States, capital punishment was the man-
datory penalty for several crimes in the early history of South
Africa. Yet during the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, relatively few offenders were actually hanged, with a
majority of those convicted of capital crimes receiving reprieves
from the Ministry of Justice.1 ' This system of reprieves by
executive authority, an authority with overtly racist policies,
surely tended to benefit white defendants, while black defen-
dants, particularly those whose victims were white, were more
likely to be executed. 2 One Minister of Justice proudly an-
nounced that he had never granted a reprieve to a black man
convicted of raping a white woman."
After Union, the death penalty continued to be mandatory
for murder except where the offender was under sixteen or was
a woman who had murdered her newly born child.' In i935
the law was amended to allow the court to impose a sentence
other than death if it found mitigating (later referred to as
120. Pet6, supra note 117, at 104-05.
121. SACHS, supra note 6, at 5, 192; JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 126 (1978).
122. A 1949 study suggested that racial considerations influenced* the
executive's decisions on reprieves in murder cases: 'Non-Whites convicted of raping
or murdering Whites are usually hanged. This pattern was attributed to the fact
that less value is attached to the life of a Non-White, while emphasis is placed on
the sanctity of the life of a White." Rhadamanthus, Contempt of Court? The Trial
of Barend Van Dyk Niekerk, in ACTA JURIDICA 77, 136 (1970) (B. Beinart et al.
eds., 1971) [hereinafter ACTA JURIDICAl quoting Handbook on Race Relations in
South Africa, 1949.
123. DUGARD, supra note 121, at 127 (quoting Mr. C.R., Swart during his ten-
ure as Minister of Justice).
124. 1917 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (Sec. 338).
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extenuating) circumstances. 5 This law, explicitly incorporat-
ing an element of discretion in capital sentencing, has resulted
in execution rates that are difficult to explain without refer-
ence to the race of the offender and the victim. While accurate
figures are not always available, 1 6 it has been estimated that
of the 2,740 persons executed since 1910, fewer than one hun-
dred were white. Nor can this disparity be explained by the
higher percentage of blacks in the population, or even among
those accused of murder and rape. For example, during one
period for which the relevant information is available, more
whites were charged with the murder or rape of black victims
than were blacks charged with the murder or rape of white
victims."2 Nonetheless, no white was sentenced to death for
the rape or murder of a black victim during three years of that
period, while thirty-seven blacks were executed for the murder
of a white victim, and thirteen for the rape of a white wom-
an.29
125. General Law Amendment Act 46, Section 61(a).
126. Research focusing on the impact of race on criminal penalties in South
Africa has been stymied not only by incomplete records, but by a distinct hostility
to scholars so much as broaching the subject. In 1970, law professor Barend van
Niekerk was tried on charges of contempt for having published the results* of a
survey of advocates in which a significant number of respondents expressed the
opinion that black offenders were more likely to be sentenced to death than white
offenders, and that this disparity was a result of conscious and deliberate discrimi-
nation. State v. Van Niekerk, 1970(3) S. 655 (T). Professor van Niekerk was
found not guilty only because the court accepted his statement that "at no time
did he have any intention to reflect improperly on the judges or the administra-
tion and that he had always held them in the highest esteem." See ACTA
JURIDICA, supra note 122, at 77, 199 (reporting the full record of the trial).
Five years later, Professor van Niekerk was sued for defamation after he
criticized the Minister of Justice for granting a reprieve to a white defendant,
while allowing his black accomplice to be hanged. His motion to dismiss was de-
nied, but apparently the lawsuit lapsed upon the death of the minister. See South
African Associated Newspapers Ltd. v. Estate Pelser, 1975(4) S.A. 797 (A.D.).
127. See DUGARD, supra note 121, at 127.
128. ACTA JURIDICA, supra note 122, at 137 (reporting figures from 1953 to
1962 derived by Mr. David Welsh from the Commissioner of Police's Report).
129. AcTA JURIDICA, supra note 122, at 137 (reporting on an analysis of sen-
tences imposed for cross-color rape and murder during 1957 to 1959).
266 [Vol. XIX:2
RACE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The same remarkable phenomenon is reported in South
Africa as in the United States: no white man has ever been
executed for raping a brown or black woman."' Indeed, very
few white men have been executed for the crime of rape, as
compared to the numbers of blacks executed for that crime.
Between 1911 and 1968, only two of the 132 South African
men executed for rape were white, both convicted of raping
young white girls.''
A study of all 118 rape convictions returned by the Durban
and Coast Local Division of the Supreme Court in the ten
years from 1970 to 1979 found that sentences for rapes with
white victims were more severe than those involving
"coloureds," Asians and blacks, in that order.' There was al-
most a two-fold increase in the severity of the sentence where
a white person was raped as compared to where the victim was
black. Where non-whites were victims, there was an eighty
percent chance of a light sentence,133 as opposed to a thirty-
seven percent chance when a white person was the victim.'
In one case, the judge explicitly found the fact that the defen-
dant accused of rape was black, while his victim was white, to
constitute an aggravating feature justifying a death sentence,
stating that the shock to her would have been all the great-
er.135
As in the United States, the death penalty for murder has
also been imposed disproportionately on blacks, especially
when the victim is white. For example, from June 1982 to
130. SACHS, supra note 6, at 154.
131. SACHS, supra note 6, at 154.
132. 0. Salmon, Sentences for Rape, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA, SE-
LECTED ASPECTS OF DISCRETION 171 (MCJ Olmesdahl & NC Steytler eds., 1983)
[hereinafter Salmon].
133. Albie Sachs also noted that young white men convicted of raping black
women were treated very leniently, sometimes just with light strokes. Sachs re-
marked that their punishment seemed to be more for giving in to temptation and
disgracing themselves than for doing violence to the victim. SACHS, supra note 6,
at 155.
134. Salmon, supra note 132, at 172.
135. S. v. Ngubelanga (Diemont, J., 6/10/66), unreported (Cape), noted in
SACHS, supra note 6, at 153.
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June 1983, of eighty-one blacks convicted of murdering whites,
thirty-eight were hanged. Of fifty-two whites convicted of mur-
dering whites, one was hanged. Of twenty-one whites convicted
of murdering blacks, none was hanged.'
Also strikingly similar to the attitudes reported in the
antebellum United States is the different treatment accorded
to assaults depending on the race of the parties. In the late
1940s, a well respected South African philosophy professor
described the phenomenon:
For a Native to use, or threaten, physical violence against a
White is a challenge to the domination of the White group
and is resented as such; similar action on the part of a White
man against a Native is more readily minimized as legiti-
mate punishment of insubordination or as "teaching the
nigger to respect the White man."3 '
Black Africans are seen, by white South Africans, as are black
Americans by many white Americans, as posing a physical
danger, such that assaults must be heavily and promptly pun-
ished so as to deter such perceived threatened violence. Here,
too, assaults regarded as particularly threatening involve black
men and white women." 8
When a commission on crime published its report in 1947,
it concluded that capital punishment should be retained in
South Africa despite the growing movement towards abolition
in Europe. The report noted that the experience of these aboli-
tionist countries was not applicable to South Africa, where the
bulk of the population "ha[s] not yet emerged from a state of
barbarism."13
9
136. Amnesty International, Racial Discrimination, Focus, Nov. 1988, at 5.
137. ALFRED HOERNLE, SOUTH AFRICAN NATIVE POLICY A1D THE LIBERAL SPIRIT
36 (1945) in ACTA JURIDICA, supra note 122, at 139.
138. Leo Marquand, Peoples and Policies of South Africa (1969), in ACTA
JURIDICA, supra note 122, at 140.
139. ACTA JUtRIDICA, supra note 122, at 135; SACHS, supra note 6, at 195.
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IV. RACISM AND CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT
In the two most recent presidential elections in the United
States, the Democratic candidates' treatment of two black
offenders may have made a critical difference in the outcome,
and surely provided one of the most potent symbols for the
electorate. Michael Dukakis was severely damaged by an inci-
dent where a black man, who had been permitted out on fur-
lough from a Massachusetts prison, was arrested for raping a
white woman. 40 On the other hand, William Clinton, despite
enormous pressure from around the world on behalf of a black
mentally disabled death row inmate, emerged stronger than
ever after allowing the execution to proceed.' In South Afri-
ca, too, while significant strides have been made since Presi-
dent deKlerk's February 2, 1990 announcements declaring an
intention to end the apartheid era, no universal elections have
yet been held, and political, economic, and social life remains
stratified along racial lines.
Surely few would dispute that racism has played a signifi-
cant role in the history of both the United States and South
Africa, and that neither country has eradicated its effects on
the life of its citizens. I suggest that one such effect is to over-
come some of the inhibition one might expect against deliber-
ately putting fellow citizens to death as a punishment for
crimes.
My hypothesis is that the retention of capital punishment
as part of the judicial systems of these countries may be relat-
ed to its imposition on those who have long themselves been
seen, when they are seen at all, as not fully human, not entire-
ly emerged from barbarism. For the same reason, capital pun-
140. The powerful appeal to white fears of the Willie Horton advertisement has
been widely noted. See, e.g., Juan Williams, The Survival of Racism under the
Constitution, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 7, 13 (1992).
141. As David Garth, the political consultant, put it. Clinton "had someone put
to death who had only part of a brain. You can't find them any tougher than
that." THE NEW YoREER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 132.
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ishment has only rarely been imposed in these countries for a
crime whose victim is black, whether that crime is murder or,
even more dramatically, rape. Whether as offender or victim,
the black man or woman is simply less of a person, a being
whose life has less value and is therefore more easily dispos-
able.
The possible connection between racism and capital pun-
ishment has been suggested by the prominent South African
advocate, Etienne Mureinik:
My point is a simple intuitive observation-it is just that
capital sentencing and racial prejudice, whether conscious or
unconscious, intersect at the phenomenon of treating people
as less than fully people. And the nature of the intersection is
this: to decide that someone should die is to say that he or
she should cease to be a person. It facilitates that decision if
there is some psychological resource permitting the
decisionmaker to see the victim in advance as less than fully
a person. Racial prejudice, or growing up in a system built on
racial prejudice, or even just living in one, are resources of
that kind.42
When a person is either not seen as a human being at all,
or seen primarily as embodying a threat to the dominant soci-
ety, it is easier to justify executing that person. Blacks, both in
the United States and in South Africa, have long fallen into
these twin categories of the invisible and the potentially dan-
gerous. Examples in American culture and literature abound,
with Mark Twain perhaps capturing best the failure to per-
ceive blacks as human beings in his classic parody of white
attitudes:
"Good gracious. Anybody hurt?"
"No'm. Killed a nigger."
"Well, it's lucky because sometimes people do get hurt.""
142. Mureinik, supra note 5, at 221.
143. MARK TWAIN, HUCKLEBERRY FINN 306 (1884).
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The same idea was conveyed by the story of a white South
African emigre:
It happened one afternoon when he was still a child, and he
was being driven past the Zoo Lake in Johannesburg. The
lake's park was crowded with off-duty workers and their
children, all of them black. And because they were black, it
was possible for someone in the car to remark, "There's no
one here today."'"
The universality of the notion that blacks are invisible is also
depicted in a popular cartoon involving a white mistress and
her black domestic servant being run in a progressive South
African newspaper. A recent strip portrayed the white matron
on a psychiatrist's couch, who, even as she confesses that
whites treat blacks as part of the furniture, fails to see the two
black workers painting a wall in the office.145
Both South Africa and the United States might do well to
consider the reasons for their adherence to a penalty regarded
in so much of the civilized world as barbaric and inhumane. If
it is at all plausible that those reasons include an element of
racism, surely that should be a powerful incentive to abandon
the practice.
144. Mureinik, supra note 5, at 220.
145. Bill Keller, Time to Laugh? The Beloved Country Thinks So, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1993, at A4.
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